Now that the dust of recent conferences has begun to settle, and the movement of Anglican-Orthodox relations has been put in danger of suspension by recent Anglican decisions to ordain women to the priesthood, it is perhaps worthwhile to take a second look at the recent ecumenical conversations to see whether anything of positive value has been gained. The Moscow Agreed Statement of 1976 (subsequently published with an extended commentary as Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue: The Moscow Agreed Statement, SPCK, 1977) lists the main areas of convergence ('agreement' being as yet too strong a word) in such matters as the knowledge of God, the place of the Scriptures and the nature of the church. In most cases the positions which each side has put forward are familiar and traditional: from the Orthodox distinction between the essence and the energies of God, which Anglicans have never really understood, to Bishop Hanson's insistence in committee that it would be wrong to 'reject wholesale all the findings of the critical study of the Bible in Europe and America over the last 200 years'—a course which the Orthodox seem to have feared (rightly) would mean giving free rein to the most liberal tendencies in modern theology.

These positions are familiar and cause no surprise. What is new (at least apparently) from these discussions, and may well provoke considerable comment in informed theological circles, is the remarkable degree of convergence, so great that it amounts in practice to agreement, on the place of the notorious filioque clause in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. Difficult as it is to believe, the Anglican members of the Joint Doctrinal Commission have unanimously agreed to recommend to their respective churches that the words 'and the Son' be dropped from that clause in the Creed which defines the procession of the Holy Spirit. A theological controversy which in one form or another has raged for nearly twelve centuries is thus to be laid to rest—at least as far as Anglicanism is concerned—in a manner which effectively admits that the eastern churches have all along been right, at least in the formal sense.
In order to measure the full importance of this decision, we quote the text of the agreement (V,21):

The Anglican members therefore agree that:

a) because the original form of the Creed referred to the origin of the Holy Spirit from the Father

b) because the *filioque* clause was introduced into this Creed without the authority of an Ecumenical Council and without due regard for Catholic consent, and

c) because this Creed constitutes the public profession of faith by the People of God in the Eucharist

the *filioque* clause should not be included in this Creed.

To this should be added an important theological point which is not included in the actual agreement but which figures prominently in the preceding paragraph (V,20):

The question of the origin of the Holy Spirit is to be distinguished from that of his mission to the world. It is with reference to the mission of the Spirit that we are to understand the biblical texts which speak both of the Father (John 14:26) and of the Son (John 15:26, as sending (pempein) the Holy Spirit.

The question which immediately arises from all this is whether the Anglican members of the Commission were right to suppose that such a remarkable degree of convergence between their own communion and the Orthodox could so easily be had. An observer of the proceedings might legitimately wonder whether a controversy which has split the church for longer that any other can really be resolved as smoothly and amicably as the Joint Doctrine Commission has suggested. If matters are as straightforward as this why was the issue not resolved generations ago, and the unhappy friction which has so often characterized East-West ecclesiastical relations mitigated accordingly?

Past experience would certainly advise caution, and a closer investigation of the propositions to which the Anglican delegation actually assented does nothing to dispel it. On the contrary, it reveals a whole theological dimension to the question which apparently went almost undiscussed (it is certainly not recorded) by the Moscow Conference but which, when given proper consideration, makes the issue of dropping *filioque* from the Creed a much more dubious proposition than the Agreed Statement makes it out to be.

**Canonical grounds**

To begin with the statement which the Anglican delegation agreed to sign, it is clear that the major element in the formal Orthodox protest against *filioque* concerns its presence in the Nicene Creed, which they regard as illegitimate and undesirable. The three points of section V,21 quoted above purport to explain why this is so. The first point is designed to brand the clause as a late interpolation, which in a sense is true,\(^2\) but its reference to the original form of the Creed is misleading. To western ears this sounds like an appeal to the Creed in
its most primitive form. Anglicans have always responded to a 'back to the sources' appeal (more a Protestant trait, one feels, than a Catholic or an Orthodox one) which gives words like 'the original form' a special attraction for them.

But of course, the Creed to which the Orthodox are appealing (i.e. our Nicene Creed minus the *filioque*) is hardly the original form in the sense in which most Anglicans would understand that term. What it means is simply the form which was finally approved (after long and acrimonious debates, including many attempts at more-or-less similar credal formulations) at the Council of Constantinople in 381. Its sacrosanct character in Orthodox eyes derives from this fact, and not from its supposedly primitive character. For most Anglicans, however, the word 'original' has emotive connotations which not only make it inappropriate in this context but false as well, since the 'original form' of the Creed, in so far as this can be known, said nothing about the Holy Spirit's origin at all.3

What point (a) is really getting at is made clear when we look at point (b), which makes it plain that the eastern text is meant to enjoy a kind of approval which the addition of *filioque* has never received. On the surface of things it must be admitted that point (b) has a certain plausibility about it, since if it did not, the problem would hardly exist. As far as is known, *filioque* was first added to the Creed at the Council of Toledo in 589. From there it spread across Western Europe, though it was not finally admitted to the Roman liturgy until c. 1014. It was never adopted in the East, where it was invoked as one reason (among others) for the so-called 'Photian schism' which lasted for a few years from 863-67.4

But if the *filioque* clause was undoubtedly a latent bone of contention between East and West, it is equally true to say that it was not the cause of lasting schism between them. Any number of factors were involved in this: (minor) differences of ecclesiastical discipline, conflicting missionary interests in the Balkans, even political rivalries between Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire. On the purely theological level, papal claims to universal jurisdiction were a far more important cause of division, and it is interesting that even at the Moscow Conference, an Orthodox delegate managed to link *filioque* to this issue (cf. *Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue*, p 65). One fact is clear, however: whatever subsequent apologists may have claimed, the *filioque* clause was not a barrier to intercommunion between East and West much, if at all, before 1204.5 In other words, both sides managed to coexist, despite this issue, for at least five, and possibly six centuries.

During all this time there were ecumenical councils, but none tried to resolve the dispute, although theologians on both sides were actively defending their respective positions. (From an Anglican perspective it is perhaps worth remarking that one of the ablest
defenders of *filioque* during this period was Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093 to 1109. His treatise *De processione Spiritus Sancti contra Graecos* was for centuries a major contribution to the western cause, and it still repays careful perusal.)

This debate could not continue indefinitely, however, and matters came to a head eventually at the Council of Lyons in 1274. But by then two developments had altered the whole spirit of the earlier debates. In the East, the Byzantine Empire had been fatally weakened by the outrageous sack of Constantinople in 1204, after which Greek prelates had been forced to submit to the Pope or else suffer persecution and exile. Latin usages—including the *filioque*—were introduced in the East in circumstances of the greatest possible bitterness and humiliation for the Orthodox. Even when the Byzantines recaptured Constantinople in 1261, there were still large parts of the East, including Cyprus, Crete and most of mainland Greece, which remained under Latin rule. The Byzantine Emperor desperately needed western support against the Normans in Sicily and the Turks in Asia Minor. Church union was the only way this help could be obtained, which is why the Council of Lyons met in 1274.

Meanwhile the intellectual revival in the West, spearheaded by Thomas Aquinas, revived medieval theology and transformed it into a coherent system based on Aristotelian categories of thought. Thomas himself died on the way to the council, but by then his influence was already widespread. Superficially, Lyons was a success. The Orthodox East agreed to accept *filioque*, at least in substance, and many of the Greek delegates were attracted to scholasticism, which was to exert a considerable influence on Byzantium until 1453. The intellectual confidence of the West combined with the national disarray of the Byzantines to produce a paper triumph for Rome, but this was never ratified in the East. The Empire very nearly plunged into religious civil war, with monks leading the opposition to the council’s decisions.

**Theological considerations**

Today the Council of Lyons is apt to seem no more than a costly failure in East-West relations, but its true significance should not be missed. After Lyons, the longstanding Orthodox objection to the *filioque* clause on canonical grounds was no longer tenable in its simple form. If ‘Catholic consent’ was all that had been required to legitimate *filioque* then Lyons had opened the way for it, since the Orthodox delegation had freely agreed to accept it. The difficulty came when this same delegation tried to implement its decision in the East, where it met with furious opposition. Why was this? Canonical considerations like those outlined in point (b) of the Moscow Statement could not be brought into play very effectively, since Lyons had so obviously undercut them. The only line of objection which could
possibly be sustained was the charge that the filioque clause was heretical, a view which had already been advanced by Photius in 867. Canonical arguments might continue to impress Anglican divines and others whose knowledge of church history was sketchy, but to serious theologians they were henceforth to be little more than a curious preface to the real issue at stake: was the filioque clause true?

To their credit, the Anglican members of the Joint Doctrinal Commission saw the need to distinguish between the chequered history of the filioque clause and the question of its truth or falsehood, though they do not seem to have recognized the relative importance of these two things. Consider for example some words of Bishop Hanson, quoted on p 63 of Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue:

No church changes anything in its Creed quickly. We should distinguish sharply between the canonical error of the West in adding the filioque and the question of whether the doctrine it expresses is good or bad. The Anglican Church will then be more likely to drop it quickly. [italics mine]

Incredible as it may seem, historical irregularities are here allowed to overrule the claims of objective truth—a surprising position for a respected theologian to adopt, and one which has been untenable at least since 1274!

The Orthodox, for their part, have long been aware that theological considerations were at the heart of the matter, and have seldom sought to defend their position on canonical grounds alone. This is made quite plain by Father Kallistos (Timothy) Ware, whose comments on the matter are worth quoting:

It was not until after 850 that the Greeks paid much attention to the filioque, but once they did so, their reaction was sharply critical. Orthodoxy objected (and still objects) to this addition to the Creed, for two reasons. First, the Ecumenical Councils specifically forbade any changes to be introduced into the Creed; and if an addition has to be made, certainly nothing short of another Ecumenical Council is competent to make it. The Creed is the common property of the whole Church, and a part of the Church has no right to tamper with it. The West, in arbitrarily altering the Creed without consulting the East, is guilty (as Khomiakov put it) of moral fratricide, of a sin against the unity of the Church. In the second place, Orthodox believe the filioque to be theologically untrue. They hold that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and consider it a heresy to say that He proceeds from the Son as well. It may seem to many that the point at issue is so abstruse as to be unimportant. But Orthodox would say that since the doctrine of the Trinity stands at the heart of the Christian faith, a small change of emphasis in Trinitarian theology has far-reaching consequences in many other fields. Not only does the filioque destroy the balance between the three persons of the Holy Trinity: it leads also to a false understanding of the work of the Spirit in the world, and so encourages a false doctrine of the Church.

This second point is taken up again later, and examined with great thoroughness. Father Ware then concludes his exposition as follows:

Such are some of the reasons why Orthodox regard the filioque as dangerous and heretical. Filioquism confuses the persons, and destroys the proper balance between unity and diversity in the Godhead. The oneness of the deity is emphasized at the expense of His threeness; God is regarded too much in terms of abstract essence and too little in terms of concrete personality.
But this is not all. Many Orthodox feel that, as a result of the *filioque*, the Holy Spirit in western thought has become subordinated to the Son—if not in theory, then at any rate in practice. The West pays insufficient attention to the work of the Spirit in the world, in the Church, in the daily life of each man.

Orthodox writers also argue that these two consequences of the *filioque*—subordination of the Holy Spirit, over-emphasis on the unity of God—have helped to bring about a distortion in the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Church. Because the role of the Spirit has been neglected in the West, the Church has come to be regarded too much as an institution of this world, governed in terms of earthly power and jurisdiction. And just as in the western doctrine of God unity was stressed at the expense of diversity, so in the western concept of the Church unity has triumphed over diversity, and the result has been too great an emphasis on Papal authority.

Two different ways of thinking about God go hand-in-hand with two different ways of thinking about the Church. The underlying causes of the schism between East and West—the *filioque* and the Papal claims—were not unconnected.

Father Ware has clearly progressed a long way from a mere canonical irregularity, and his explanation is fairly typical of the Orthodox position. But if such weighty matters as these are involved, why were they not discussed at Moscow? Father Ware was himself secretary to the Commission, and could easily have raised them as points for discussion, if no one else had been willing or able to. It would be uncharitable to blame this oversight either on Orthodox deviousness or on Anglican theological incompetence, but the usual reasons which conferences give for failing to tackle major issues (lack of time, shortage of resources, etc.) will hardly suffice in this case.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn: the Anglican delegates to the Moscow Conference acceded to the Orthodox demands without paying the slightest attention to the theological implications. The most important aspect of the whole question was simply left out! This is in marked contrast to the position of the Old Catholics who, although they rejected *filioque* at Chambésy in August 1975, did so on theological grounds, i.e. by accepting the Orthodox doctrine of trinitarian relations. The Old Catholics were certainly right to discuss the matter in terms of theology, but their ready accession to the Orthodox position may be questioned. If theological considerations are what really count, is the Orthodox case strong enough to warrant the deletion of the *filioque* clause on these grounds?

**Orthodox objections**

We may look first at the question of *filioque* and the papal claims, which the Orthodox insist are closely connected. For them, the *filioque* clause implies a ‘subordination’ of the Spirit to the Son which is reflected in the subordination of the church to the Son’s vicar on earth—the Pope. It is an interesting equation, and one which from an Orthodox standpoint can be made to seem plausible enough. The two issues were frequently coupled in the late medieval debates on reunion, and together they are still the main stumbling-blocks to
Orthodox reconciliation with Rome. But theologically speaking, it is hard to see how they are connected. The *filioque* clause took more than four centuries to be accepted at Rome, and this despite the considerable pressure which was put on the Pope by Charlemagne and his theologians. Why should this have been so, if *filioque* reflected and reinforced papal claims to universal spiritual dominion? Furthermore—and this is of more direct relevance to Anglicans—the Reformers in the sixteenth century managed to break with Rome without abandoning *filioque*, whose most ardent modern champion, Karl Barth, was not exactly an arch-papist! How do the Orthodox explain what to them must be a strange paradox? At the Moscow Conference, Archbishop Stylianos of Australia accused the Anglicans of inconsistency at this point, but while it is possible that Archbishop Cranmer was so eager to break with Rome that he failed to notice the credal consequences of his act, it is difficult to use this argument against more recent writers, including Anglicans like the late W. H. Griffith Thomas, or the late H. B. Swete, who defended the theology of the *filioque* without reference to the Pope or to ecclesiology.

The Orthodox are on firmer ground when they criticize the West for regarding God too much in terms of an abstract essence, and too little in terms of personal being. According to them, the *filioque* doctrine is a prime manifestation of this tendency because it over­rides the distinctive characteristic of the Father, which is his 'monarchy' within the Godhead. By this is meant that the Father alone is the fountainhead of deity, the senior member, as it were, of the Trinity. The western church obscured this principle by claim­ing that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, as from one principle (*tamquam ab uno principio*).

The significance of the Orthodox objection can only be grasped if we appreciate that, for them, personality is the most fundamental reality in God. In Orthodoxy the generation of the Son and the pro­cession of the Spirit can be said to have a more literal meaning than in the West, since the second and third persons of the Trinity owe their very hypostasis to the first. In such a scheme, a double procession of the Spirit is inconceivable, since the Son also depends on the Father for his existence.

**Western views**

In the West this trinitarian model was rejected by Augustine and others, largely because it seemed to leave traces of subordinationism and even of temporality within the Godhead. According to Augustine, all three persons of the Trinity were equal: none was subordinate to the others. Their respective roles, or persons, were defined by their mutual relationships. The monarchy of the Father was upheld, not on the grounds that he preceded or gave existence to the Son and the
Spirit (things which could only have a meaning within the context of the temporal), but rather because he stood in that eternal relationship to them which we call fatherhood. Because the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son as well as of the Father, he stands in the same relationship to both; i.e., he proceeds from both the Father and the Son.

This is clearly a different conception from the Orthodox one, but it does not mean that the West necessarily regards the principle of the Godhead as an abstract essence devoid of personality. On the contrary, the West has generally held that personality is inherent in the essence of divinity, and that three persons are to be found in the very being of God. It is nonsense to speak of a priority of person, since to do so, even in a purely formal sense, introduces an element of temporality into the Godhead.

When the West speaks of generation and procession therefore, it does not have any particular activity in mind, since action demands a beginning and an end: i.e., some point at which it could be said that the birth or the emanation had not yet occurred, and some other point at which it could be said that they were complete. In western theology the language of generation and procession is indeed more figurative (‘abstract’) than it is in the East, and less comprehensible to the finite human intellect (‘concrete’). But this is precisely because western theology has always tried to preserve the delicate balance between the unity and the diversity within God, not because it has (unwittingly?) allowed this balance to be upset or obscured.

Having said this, the Orthodox are probably justified to feel apprehensive at the western formula which identifies the persons with the relations (Personae sunt ipsae relationes). However little western theologians in the past may have wished to encourage a latent modalism, it must be admitted that this is a real danger inherent in the above equation, and one of which we may expect the Orthodox to have been particularly conscious. The ante-Nicene fathers habitually spoke of three hypostases in the Godhead, and the eastern church agreed to use prosopon (=persona) largely to avoid confusion with the Latin substantia, which is the etymological equivalent of hypostasis. But the earlier tradition remained as an interpretative check on prosopon, whose simple meaning was ‘mask’. Unfortunately this qualification is less readily available in Latin, and the temptation to reduce persona to its primary meaning—thereby introducing modalism by the back door—is such that it is probably advisable to make some sort of distinction between the persons themselves and their relationships. In this case at least, the West may well have pushed logic into that rationalism which the East so greatly fears.

Of course arguments like these are unlikely to convince the Orthodox now any more than they have in the past, but it is important to appreciate the inner coherence of western trinitarianism, which embraces filioque as a matter of course, and does not feel it to be an
extraneous element. There is no doubt that the eastern tradition represents an older theological model than does the western, but this does not necessarily mean that it is closer to biblical teaching. Indeed most western theologians would claim that Augustine, and the West generally, were obliged to move away from the earlier model precisely because it was inadequate to do justice to what the New Testament taught.

The bar of Scripture is the final court of appeal, as both sides recognize, and so it is disappointing to find such a sketchy analysis of relevant texts in the Moscow statements. The only two which are mentioned are from John’s Gospel (14:26; 15:26), both of which are declared to refer only to the *temporal mission* of the Holy Spirit, not to his eternal procession. Strictly speaking, this may well be true, but it proves nothing. There are many passages both in these chapters and elsewhere in the New Testament which make it plain that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ in the fullest sense, so much so in fact that Jesus was able to reassure his disciples that he would return to them in the person of the Spirit. ¹⁰

The difficulty which western theology has always had with the Orthodox position may be stated as follows: if the Spirit proceeded *directly* from the Father and not from the Son at all, the Son would have no power to send the Spirit, nor would the Spirit be able to bear witness to the Son or stand *in loco Filii*. To put it another way; the Spirit might be the *alternative* to the Son, but he could never be the *substitute*, as Scripture says he is.

**An ingenious compromise**

There is some indication that this problem has been felt in Orthodox circles, and there is now a considerable body of opinion in the East which is prepared to allow that the Spirit is *eternally manifested* by the Son, though he proceeds uniquely from the Father. This ingenious compromise was worked out in the century after Lyons in 1274, and is sometimes called the Palamite solution, because it was advocated (though not invented) by Gregory Palamas, Archbishop of Thessalonica from 1341 to 1359 and the leading spokesman of hesychasm.

Palamas and those who thought like him (who were not all hesychasts, by any means) believed that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father *through* the Son, a statement which satisfied the need to define the relationship of the Son to the Spirit without accepting the double procession of the latter. The formula was not discussed at Moscow ¹¹ and its status within Orthodoxy remains uncertain. Anglicans should therefore be careful not to regard it as an acceptable compromise on the Orthodox side, though they should be willing to admit that it tightens up the eastern doctrine and thus somewhat lessens the standard western objections to it.
Yet when all is said and done, the Palamite formula is really no more satisfactory as a substitute for *filioque* than the classical Orthodox doctrine is. On the purely formal level there may not be a great deal of difference between his theology and that of the double procession; indeed, at the Council of Florence in 1439 both East and West managed to agree that the two were in fact identical. (This agreement was generally repudiated by the East of course, and did not survive the Fall of Constantinople in 1453.)

The gulf between them, however, becomes fully apparent in the realm of practice. Tied to Palamas' formula was a complete spirituality, which in many ways was the eastern answer to scholasticism. At the heart of Palamas’ thinking is the concept of *theosis* (deification) which is the goal of every Christian. Sin is the inevitable product of human finitude, eradicable only by a transformation of the soul into that perfection which is the unique possession of the being of God. The Platonic elements in this scheme are obvious, and Palamas belongs firmly in a spiritual tradition which includes such figures as the pseudo-Dionysius and the leading iconodules (opponents of iconoclasm).

What is less obvious is that Palamite theology leads to an interpretation of the work of the Son which stresses his mediatorial role to the point where he almost ceases to be coequal with the Father. The Son is the icon of divinity, the visible manifestation of the eternal God. As such, he has not unnaturally manifested the Spirit from all eternity, but the ultimate purpose of the latter’s work is to bring the believer through the Son to the Father, who in the final sense is alone truly ‘God’.

The western conception of man’s spiritual destiny is rather different from this. In western eyes, sin is due not to finitude but to human disobedience. Sanctification (as distinct from deification) means the striving after creaturely perfection, in the image of the incarnate Christ. To put it bluntly, the eastern church understands Christ as the way to the Father (i.e. the means to an end) whereas the western church sees in Christ the Father come to us (i.e. the end in himself). In Christological terms these views are not irreconcilable, as the common Chalcedonian orthodoxy makes plain. But at the pneumatological level they are irreconcilable, since the Spirit, as the agent of Christ, is called upon to do something different in either case.

In the final analysis, therefore, the difference between eastern and western views of the Spirit stems from their different conceptions of man’s destiny in Christ. In a framework of *theosis*, the Spirit cannot proceed from the Son in the same sense as he is said to proceed from the Father, whereas in the western scheme of sanctification the Spirit must proceed from both in identical fashion. This is not a mere canonical irregularity, but a fundamental difference of theology which affects the whole of our spiritual life, including the
way we pray. It also affects religious art: western piety can endure statuary (which in eastern eyes is ‘self-sufficient’, and therefore presumptuous) since statues are an expression of creaturely perfection; the East prefers icons, whose third dimension is considered to be the transcendent.

A precipitate decision
These then are some of the reasons why filioque cannot be dismissed as easily as some Anglicans would like. But are there any grounds for retaining it as superior to the Orthodox conception? The usual western argument has been that filioque preserves a proper emphasis on the person and work of the Son in our spiritual life, guarding against a disincarnate piety and against a temptation to bypass the atonement in our preaching and spiritual experience. Today, in the light of the charismatic movement, it is more necessary than ever to keep the person and work of the Spirit closely tied to that of the Son if we are not to see our Christianity dissipated in a kind of existentialism.

These are obviously matters which require much more consideration by contemporary Anglican theologians than they have so far received, and which make any precipitate decision to abandon filioque most unwise. It must therefore be seriously doubted whether the Anglican-Orthodox conversations have made any real progress in this area. On the other hand, the Moscow discussions have made some things, at least, reasonably clear. The first is that the Orthodox are much more united among themselves and conscious of their objectives than are the Anglicans. They made no concessions of any kind on the issue, nor are they likely to, considering that their own Palamite formula, which seeks to meet the West half-way, was not discussed. The Anglicans by contrast seemed unsure of themselves and unable (or unwilling) to discuss serious theological questions in a responsible way.

Many of the Anglican members of the Joint Doctrinal Commission are evidently unfamiliar with Orthodoxy, and none comes from, or has done the bulk of his theological training in, an Orthodox country or milieu. By contrast, many of the Orthodox members are intimately acquainted with the West; and at least one, Father Kallistos Ware, is a convert from Anglicanism. There is therefore a much greater understanding of the West on the Orthodox side than there is of the East among the Anglicans. Consider, for example, some remarks in a recent booklet of which Mr Roger Beckwith, a member of the Joint Doctrinal Commission, was a co-author:

With Catholics, Anglican, Roman and Old, and with the Orthodox, Evangelicals do not have to argue the truth of the Bible . . . nor is there divergence on the Holy Trinity . . .

Obviously when even one of the more acute theologians on the
CHURCHMAN

Anglican team can put his name to such a statement, the prospects for giving the filioque clause an adequate assessment are not likely to be good. At the time of writing it is uncertain whether Anglican-Orthodox dialogue is likely to proceed any farther. But whether it does or not, the message for Anglicans is clear: there is an urgent need for them to rediscover their own theology, and to examine its true relationship, not only to the Greek Fathers (as seen through western eyes) but to the reality of modern Orthodoxy. Only when this has been adequately done will Anglican theologians be in a position to conduct serious and realistic discussions of the filioque (and of other matters which divide us) on a level of theological analysis appropriate both to the gravity of the issues involved and to the significance which the Orthodox have consistently attached to them.

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NOTES

1 There is a most illuminating study of Orthodox dialogue with both Anglicans and Old Catholics in the nineteenth century in Aspects of Church History: Volume IV, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky (Belmont : Massachusetts 1975) pp 213-80. The careful reader of these pages will soon detect how closely these discussions parallel the current ones both in subject matter and in results.

2 Though it first appeared at the Council of Toledo in 589, the doctrine itself is basically Augustinian. Barth even argues that it was left out at Constantinople because it was not a matter of dispute: everyone thought it was self-evident (cf. Church Dogmatics, I, 1, pp 546-8).

3 On this subject, see J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (London 1950).

4 Photius was Patriarch of Constantinople at the time. On the schism, see F. Dvornik, The Photian Schism (Cambridge 1948).

5 No one knows exactly when East and West split apart. Rome and Constantinople broke officially in 1054, but this was not taken all that seriously at the time, and it did not affect the First Crusade (1096-9). A more ominous sign was when the Crusaders set up Latin Patriarchs in competition with the Greek at Antioch and Jerusalem. Even then, however, the schism was not complete. This did not really happen until the sack of Constantinople in 1204, and then the reasons were more political than theological.

6 T. Ware, The Orthodox Church (London 1963) pp 59-60.

7 Ibid. pp 222-3.

8 Barth, op. cit. pp 536-57.


11 Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue p 62.